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Most writers I on criminal law invariably address, if not initiate, a discus­
sion on the powers of the police to investigate crime, by asserting the neces­
sity to strike a balance between those powers and the rights of the citizen. In 
other words any statute purporting to regulate the investigation of crimes 
should reflect a balance between the powers necessary for police officers to 
fulfill their duties and the protection of a person's civil and political rights. 
The tendency shared by criminal law commentators to emphasise the 
importance of maintaining this balance, may perhaps be attributed to the 
knowledge that the .statute book has not in the past been very convincing in 
its legislative efforts to strike a just and equitable balance. Regrettably, in 
practice, the path where the powers of the protectors and rights of the 
protected cross, reflects a grey area. Two schools of thought depict the 
situation. One school of thought calls for the stengthening and the enlarge­
ment of police powers necessary to deal with professional criminality as a 
means of curbing international narcotic circles, terrorism, homicides and 
other offences of a 'serious and grave nature'. Nevertheless, not all criminals 
deserve the notoriety enjoyed by the perpetrators of heinous offences, and 
therefore should not be treated in the same manner. Otherwise, wide 
ranging powers enjoyed by the police would, in all probability, have 
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ill-fated effects and consequences not merely on the suspect and on the petty 
criminal, yet particularly in those cases where a person is fortuitously 
present in the wrong place at the wrong time. The main concern, therefore, 
of those who belong to the so-called libertarian school, comes as a direct 
result of the possibility that police officers may abuse of the powers they 
have been entrusted with. On the other hand, the authoritarian school calls 
for the reaffirmation of the suspects' rights, for the establishment of eff ec­
tive means for review, and for accountability of the already existing and far 
too strong powers entrusted to those officially involved in the maintaining 
of law and order. 2 As the Lord Chancellor succinctly points out, "there are 
the l�w and order boys (and girls) at one end of the pitch, and the human 
and civil rights lobby on the other''. 3 
The main issue which confronts the harmonisation of· the views 
propagated by the two schools of thought, is to seek the way in which the 
most appropriate form of compromise between their polar opinions can 
best be formulated. The necessary equation must reinforce the basic 
purpose of criminal law in regulating the acts of individual members of 
society with each other and in their relations with society as a whole. 
Furthermore it must protect the law abiding citizens from the transgressors 
of well defined and predetermined laws and the perpetrators of socially 
reprehensible acts. Above all, it should ascertain that the powers entrusted 
to those whose duty is to secure the detention of transgressors, are kept in 
check. The enforcement of criminal law provisions of· necessity allow a 
certain degree of encroachment upon the freedoms of individuals. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the basic rights may be encroached upon is 
not limitless and far from unqualified, particularly to trespassers who 
would like the public to think that they do so in the name of justice and the 
maintenance of law and order. Above all, the delineation of the confines 
within which police powers may be exercised in relation to the protection of 
citizens' rights, poses an added dimension to an already complex problem 
movinig in a vicious circle. It is not sufficient for a limit to be set, up to 
which certain behaviour of an inquisitorial nature is allowed. The absence 
of any limit may be intolerable, yet any ill-defined and obscure wide­
ranging power, the exercise of which is left at the discretion of the executing 
officer is equally unacceptable. In defence of the exercise of such arbitrary 
powers one view put forward rather naively, is that it would be better to 
have enforceable wide powers rather than none at all. Again other views 
taken up, reaffirm the necessity principle, which apparently justifies the 
promulgation of statutorily controlled boundaries large enough to combat 
criminality on any level, high and low. However, what lies at the heart of 
the matter is the rather utopian quest to provide enough room for the police 
to go about their duty without violating the civil and political rights of the 
2 Vide comments by Lord Hooson in the debate of the 2nd reading of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Bill 1984 (No. 303), House of Lords Debates Weekly Hansard 4 June, 
1984 cols. 415-421. 
3 2nd reading, opening speech on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 1984 in the House 
of Lords Weekly Hansard 4 June, 1984 col. 405. 
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Regretably the last decade did not venture far in securing the ideal 
solution to the fight against crime in England. A decade largely dominated 
by the 11th Report of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee 
(1972), 4 which called for the abolition of the suspect's right of silence 
during police questioning. However, it also proposed a number of safe­
guards which did not seem to approach the equilibrium of power with 
apprehension and caution, but seemed to tip the balance in favour of the 
defence to the extent that hardened criminals could escape the accusatorial 
arm of the law with virtually little difficulty. Moreover the Confait case as 
commented upon in the Fisher Report 5 imparted clearly the picture that the 
police did not follow, perhaps were even ignorant of, the rules of regulating 
the investigation of crime. Dr. MacBarnet opines that the 11th Report did 
not succed to suggest the need for a criminal justice system tailored for 
providing decisive and categorical scope to investigatory powers. On the 
contrary, an image was portrayed, where due to the manipulation of those 
very same powers by police officers during questioning periods, crime 
suspects could be induced to confess to crimes that they had never com­
mitted. 6 Professor Leight confirms, that antagonistic and oppressive 
attitudes adopted by police officers during interrogations cannot always be 
brushed aside in the hope that their justification rests with ''errors made in 
good faith rather than consciously overbearing conduct''. 7 
The position regulating the questioning of criminal suspects by the police 
in England, prior to the rules laid down by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, could hardly have been called statutory, at the utmost 
administrative. The situation was regulated by a set of rules and directions 
issued by the Home Office to guide police officers in the conduct of their 
investigations. 8 · They were devoid of any legal force or statutory power, their 
purpose was to serve as a guideline to the investigating officer when 
obtaining a statement from a detained person in connection with the 
commission or otherwise of an offence. In addition the evidence obtained 
therefrom may or may not have been admissable in a court of law at the 
discretion of the trial judge. Actually the admissibility of evidence is 
immune to a certain degree from the fact that it may or may not have been 
obtained in breach of the Judges' Rules. 9 Needless to say that the position 
could be described as permissive and in need of reform. Quoting Glanville 
Williams, Professor Leigh advocates the abolition of the rules" 10 One 
4 Command. 4991. 
5 1977/78 H.C. 90. 
6 Vide "Balance & Clarity; has the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure achieved 
them" in C.L.R. (1981) 445. 
7 Report on the Report of the R.C.C.P. - L.H. Leigh 44 Mod. L. Rev. (I 981) at pp. 303. 
8 Judges' Rules and Administrative directions to the Police H.O. Circular No. 89/1978. 
9 For further reading vide "Police Powers in England and Wales" by L.H. Leigh 1975, at 
Chapter VIII pp 141 et seq. 
IO Vlde P. Morris on the Judges' Rules in "Police Interrogation in England and Wales" 
1978 pp 29; vide also R.C.C.P. Research Study nos. 3 & 4 on Police Interrogation at 
pp. 31 -32. 
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suggestion for reform, which seemed to be inevitable, and was to a certain 
extent always in the offing, concerned the desperate need to codify by 
statutory instrument the entire area dealing with the interrogation of 
suspects. In other words it was felt necessary to provide for the enactment 
of provisions categorically establishing the basic safeguards due to the 
detainee or the accused, and above all regulating the admissability of 
confessions made in police custody. Furthermore the compromise so much 
yearned for in striking that balance, between the rights of the suspect and 
the limits within which police officers could carry out their investigations, 
was lacking and very much necessary for the l 970's. A period described by 
Dr. MacBarnet to be "characterised by the rise of a powerful law and order 
lobby" . 11 
A Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure was set up "with the 
unenviable task of seeking a balance". 12 In its Report 13 the Royal Commis­
sion makes that purpose clear. Its goals were admirabe, the research work 
carried out on various aspects of crime investigation novel, and of unpre­
cedented value in an area which would not be unjustly described as to have 
been wanting. Nevertheless the end result attracted a fair amount of 
criticism despite the fact that it based the construction of its report on a 
triangular premiss of "fairness", "openess" and "workability". Whether 
or not the Royal Commission succeded in striking the balance it set out to 
obtain, cannot be answered in a categorical fashion. Admittedly certain 
aspects of the law on criminal investigation have been gathered with a view 
to be implemented and endowed with legislative force. On the other hand it 
is extremely doubtful whether any equilibrium at all has been preserved in the 
balance. Indeed, if at all, the balance seems to have been tipped in favour of 
alleviating the police from any obstacle they may meet in the course of their 
enquiries. 
Some writers take the extreme view that the Royal Commission actually 
failed to achieve both tasks with which it was entrusted. Namely, in striking 
the balance between police powers and civil rights; and also in its attempt to 
clarify precisely those powers vis-a-vis the suspect. 14 Mr. S.P. Best has 
summed up the position by stating that "attempts at compromise, often 
well intended, frequently fail to achieve the desired end of pleasing 
everybody." He further adds that many of the Commission's features 
seemed to be the result of "woolly thinking and will" and if enacted would 
make a bad situation worse.15 
However, to strike that proper balance, is not simply a question of 
finding the middle line between two poles. "The golden mean between 
efficiency in law enforcement and protection of the rights of accused 
persons in criminal cases is not easy to find, nor is it likely to have any 
I I op.cit. at fn. 6 pp. 446. 
12 ibid. 
13 "The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences in England and Wales: the 
Law and Procedure Vol." Command 8092- I, 1980. 
14 vide MacBarnet op.cit. fn. 6 at p. 447. 
15 "Compromise by the R.C.C.P." 125 Solicitor's Jnl. (1981)70. 
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permanent resting place". 16 The line of demarcation is elusive and very
much determined by political and social values. 17 As the Lord Chancellor 
confirms "law and order must be on the menu of every political party". 
Indeed the noble Lord together with other colleagues in the House of Lords, 
emphasised almost to the point of rhetorical boredom, that the whole policy 
behind the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill was to strike a balance. 1s On 
the other hand some commentators have gone as far as to imply that the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act hardly fulfilled, if at all, the purpose it 
was being enacted for. As opposed to epitomising the policy of fight against 
crime, adopted as an election issue by the Government of the day in 
proposing the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, it was claimed that the 
new law had nothing to do with the so-called war on crime. At best, its 
supporters could only consider it as an attempt, perhaps an abortive one at 
that too, to refurbish the present state of police law in relation to suspects' 
rights.19 The ascertainment and the extent to which such a statement is true 
in relation to the rights of the arrested is the task that now lies ahead. 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act in essence reflects the adoption of 
a substantive part of the recommendations proposed by the Commission's 
Report. 20 It omits, however, the amendments proposed in the Report on 
the establishment of a new independent prosecution system. Nevertheless 
any hope would be alien to the notion of expecting the Act to succeed where 
the Report failed. Similar to the Commission's work, the Act's scope is to 
strike a balance between the powers, necessary for the maintenance of 
public order on the one side and the protection of citizens' rights on the 
other. In addition, it concerns itself with providing a codified framework 
with the, previously absent, power of legislative force to clarify and 
delineate once and for all the legal position on arrest, detention, search and 
seizure together with other related areas of crime detection. The Act is said 
to ''redefine and adjust the law in respect of powers that are required by the 
police for the prevention and investigation of crime. . . . However, the 
exercise of these powers renders people, who may or may not be criminal, 
vulnerable to invasion of their liberty and abuse of their rights. A balance 
must be struck and it must permeate the whole structure from first principle 
to last detail". 21
Jn fact as the proposed law approached the ultimate opportunity of 
undergoing any radical and official amendment in the House of Lords, 
Lord Elwyn-Jones pointed out that the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill's 
most vital failure was to secure the restoration of public confidence in the 
16 Vide "The Rights of the Accused in Criminal Cases" by Linvingston Hall in 'Talks on 
American Law', Voice of America Forum Series, edited by Harold J. Berman, 
Washington, 1978. 
17 Vide MacBarnet op.cit. fn. 6 pp. 53. 
18 Vide Weekly Hansard 4/6/84 col. 405; vide also The Times Editorial comment of the 
30/3/84. 
19 Editorial comment in Vol. 133 N. L. Jnl. (1983) 429. 
20 Command. 8092. 
21 See The Times leading article 30/3/84. 
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police. The noble Lord rests his case by quoting from a leading paper ''not 
famous for criticising a Tory government", which described the Bill at that 
stage as "an unlovely measure raising in almost every clause prickly questions 
about the balance between authority and liberty. Beyond .... dispute, it 
tilts the balance towards the police". Aware of the differing views espoused 
by most of its readers, the newspaper attempts to justify its comments by 
adding that the tilt of the balance of power is inevitably due to the ever 
increasing rate and change in the nature of crime. However, the newspaper 
could not help itself from drawing the conclusion that at that moment in 
time the Bill seemed to go too far in allowing the police to exercise powers 
whose only safeguard is based on trust. 
The struggle between the authoritarian and the libertarian schools, like 
the two families of Verona, echoes incessantly, and haunted the Act in its 
entire route through the legislative process. 
Arrest and Detention 
The rights of the suspect begin where the powers of the investigating 
officer come into operation. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act mainly 
considers these rights in Parts IV and V relating to Detention and the 
Questioning and Treatment of Persons by Police. On the other hand, the 
Act's provisions concerning the powers entrusted to officers regulating their 
entry and search into the suspect's property, together with the added 
facility of seizing and retaining that property, manifest the wide gap which 
subsists in the suspect's protection from the discretionary exercise of 
investigative powers. An examination of the relevant clauses which purport 
to provide adequate safeguards to the suspect seeks to show that the 
legislator's intention was to envisage a situation where a person who could 
help police in their investigations would not be detained unnecessarily in 
police custody unless, of course, his presence there is further required. The 
contemplation of such a situation, however, begs the question as to what 
circumstances warrant an extended period of detention and if so, for how 
long and whether the suspect can be kept in ignorance of the reasons for 
which he is detained without being formally charged with having committed 
a particular offence. 23 
The starting point of what may be an unforgettable ordeal for the 
person concerned, lies with the moment of arrest. The position and the law 
of arrest as Lord Denning puts it, "is a hopeless muddle and in a confused 
state". 24 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act attempts to elucidate the 
complex state of affairs. At the outset it, however, regrettably fails to 
provide a clear definition of what constitutes or is meant by arrest. The 
established principle at common law is that arrest necessarily consists in the 
seizure or touching of the person's body with a view to his restraint. 25 
22 Refer to the House of Lords Weekly Hansard 4 June, 1984 cols. 411 - 412. 
23 Vide clauses 40 to 43. 
24 Vide House of Lords Debates Hansard 4/6/84 col. 426. 
25 Vide art. 99 on Arrest in Halsbury's Law of England 4th Ed. Vol. 11 at pp. 73. 
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Words to the effect that a person is under arrest do not necessarily amount 
to the actual arrest of that person unless uttered in a manner which in the 
circumstances are calculated to make quite clear to that person that he is 
under arrest and he so submits. 26 As early as 1704, the English courts laid 
down the principle that for a proper arrest to subsist, it is necessary that 
corporal seizure or physical contact of the suspect's body by the arresting 
officer actually takes place. 21 However it has also been held, that although 
words to the effect that a person has been placed under arrest, are not "per 
se" sufficient to constitute arrest, that person's consequent restraint is 
lawful as long as he submitted voluntarily to accompany the arresting 
officer as a direct result of the words addressed to him. 
A more recent case 29 makes the position at law clearer in emphasising 
the point that a person is lawfully under arrest irrespective of how the words 
addressed to that person are formulated as long as they are explicit enough 
to make the addressee aware that he is not free to leave the officer's 
presence. If the words uttered by the arresting officer are not to that effect 
and fail to convey the message, arrest is considered not to have taken place. 
It is suggested that due care and effort is necessary to make the positiion 
quite clear to the person concerned particularly in cases where the suspect 
may be under the effect of intoxicants or alcohol. 30, In actual fact as Bishop 
sums it up ''it all depends upon the circumstances of each case and whether 
it has been shown that a person has been arrested. It is not possible to speak 
of a magic formula". 31 
In its Report on the law of arrest, the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure, omits any discussion on the definition of that concept. It seems 
to be rather more concerned with "the ultimate purpose of arrest i.e. in 
bringing a person to trial for committing or having been reasonably 
suspected of committing a criminal offence". 32 It in fact dwells on what 
standards should be applied in order to determine what amounts to 
reasonable suspicion, and as far as providing a definition as to what con­
stitutes arrest there seem to be no comments made available by the 
Commission. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that mention is made of the right 
26 Vide L.H. Leigh on "Arrest in Police Powers in England and Wales" at pp 37; vide also 
R. W. Harding on "The Law of Arrest in Australia" in "The Australian Criminal 
Justice System" ed. by D. Chappell, and P. Wilson 2nd Ed. 1977 pp. 243-244. 
(27) Vide Genner v Sparks (1704), 6 Mod. Rep. 173.
(28) Russen v Lucas (1824) 1 C & p 153, and in Horner v Battyn (1939) Bull. N.P. 61, the
principle of defendant's submission to bailiff's authority was upheld.
(29) Alderson v Booth (1969) 2 All. E.R. 271.
(30) In Wheatley v Lodge (1971) 1 ALL E.R. 173, it was held that as long as the arresting
officer does all in his power that a reasonable man is expected to do in the circumstances
upon realising that the person in his custody was deaf even if that person could not lip­
read or otherwise communicate with the officer.
31 J.B. Bishop "Criminal Procedure" 1st Ed. 1983 Chapter 2 at pp. 43; vide also R v
Inwood on this particular point in 2 ALL E. R. (1973) 645 and L. W .L.R. (1973) 647.
(32) Report para 3.65 at pp. 40. 
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to be informed of the reasons for one's arrest. 33 Indeed, the Commission
stresses the proposed restriction of the circumstances in which police can 
exercise the powers it entrusts to them. Nevertheless, it equally makes clear 
the point that it has no intention of doing that at the expense of hindering 
the police from fulfilling their functionS. 34 Thus, despite the admission by 
the Commission that the law on arrest is ''lacking clarity and found in an 
uneasy and confused mixture of common law and statutory powers .... the 
latter having grown piecemeal and without any consistent rationale", 35 ·. it 
must be seen to what extent it has fallen short of precisely altering that 
situation. In this light the balance between powers and rights, about which 
so much ado has been made, would seem to incline towards the protectors 
rather than the protected. 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, being the legislative image of 
the Commission's work, gives statutory expression to a rule established 
under English common law which comes in the form of a safeguard to the 
suspect. That safeguard, subject to certain exceptions, is the right to be 
informed of the reasons for arrest. 36 The principle has been well established
by the leading case on this aspect in Christie v Leachinsky. 37
The courts in R v Weir 38 again upheld the rule that a valid arrest
consisted of two ingredients: (a) physical restaint and (b) a valid and true 
reason for the arrest. Where a person had been arrested on suspicion of one 
offence and although already under restraint, it is still absolutely necessary 
to inform him of any other reason if he is to be restrained on suspicion of 
having committed a different offence. Failure to inform him of a different 
reason for a different offence does not amount to arrest and would 
therefore not be entitled to be held in custody. As recent as the case Pedro v 
Diss 39 it was again upheld on the basis of Inwood (1973) 53 Cr. App. R. 
529 and of Christie v Leachinsky (1947) A.C. 543, that a police officer 
could not detain a person without conveying to him that he was under arrest 
and the reasons for being so. 
Yet as early as 1828, emerged the first ground where an exception to the 
general rule of being informed of the reasons for the offence, was allowed. In 
re Howarth had established, that if in the circumstances it is quite obvious, 
for a person to realise the reason for which he is or is about to be apprehended, 
any subsequent restraint shall be lawful and any resistance thereto illegal even 
if no words are actually said as to indicate why he is under control. 40 
Although if Howarth was once right, it had been overshadowed by Christie 
v Leachinsky. In fact, Stanley Cohen writing on the "Investigation of 
33 Ibid para 3.69. 
34 Report para 3.75. 
35 Ibid para 3.68. 
36 Vide clause 28 of the Act. 
37 1 ALL E.R. (1947) 567. 
38 (1972) 3 ALL E.R. 906. 
39 1980 Q.B. & C.L.R. 1981 236- 238. 
40 In R v Howarth (1828) l Mood CC 207; vide also Gel/berg v Miller (1961) l ALL E.R. 
291. 
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Offences and Police Powers" lays down the principle that "in theory an 
arrest consists of the actual seizure or touching of a person's body with a 
view, to detention", and confirms that "it may in fact entail far less than 
this. So long as there is submission to the process the mere pronouncing of 
words by the arresting officer will suffice''. 41 However sub-section 4 of 
clause 28 in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act amends the whole 
position radically. It makes it quite clear that a person shall be informed of 
the reasons for his arrest irrespective as to whether the fact of the arrest is in 
itself quite obvious. Such amendments are commendable and in fact Section 
28 extends the obligation of the police officer to inform the person that he is 
under arrest dispite the fact that he may have realised it or that the circum­
stances may have so indicated. 42 
In essence a detainee's right to know that he is under arrest and the 
reasons therefor, have been upheld by the Act. It is further stipulated that 
where the detainee escapes from police custody before the arresting officer 
had opportunity to inform him of his rights, the off ender should not later, 
if apprehended, invoke that ommission as amounting to a violation of this 
right. 43 What is rather disappointing, in an otherwise reformed state of the 
law, is that both rights of the detainee shall be made known to him as soon 
as practicable after his arrest and thus leaving a certain amount of 
discretion in the hands of the police officers in determining what may or 
may not be practicable. As the Royal Commission rightly admits, the lack 
of a definition of such a term allows for flexibility but produces uncertainty 
for both police and suspect. 44 On the whole, however, clause 28 has been 
enacted including certain welcome changes, in line with the main principles 
enunciated in Christie v Leachinsky, 45 having somewhat taken into 
consideration also the Commission's proposals of eliminating a "helping 
the police with their inquiries" situation. 
As a matter of fact clause 29 of the Act allows for clarification of the 
position of a person who voluntarily attends at a police station or at any 
other place in the presence of a constable without having been formally 
arrested. The principle it seeks to establish is to make categorically certain 
that any person who voluntarily presents himself at a police station or at 
another place to assist the Police in the investigation of an offence, is free to 
leave at any time and without any restriction. In its Report the Royal 
Commission makes it clear that its intention was to do away with the grey 
area of having a half-way house between liberty and arrest. It would be 
desirious to establish a situation where a person is either under arrest or he 
is not. Referring to the judgment delivered by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Reg. v. Whitfield, 46 Cohen adds that "there is no room for sub-division 
of the concept of 'arrest' into 'custodial' arrest and 'symbolical' or 
41 Op.cit. 13 Ottawa L. Rev. (1981) 549 at 559. 
42 Vide clause 28 sub-section 2. 
43 Section 28 sub-section 5. 
44 Report para. 3.98. 
45 (1947) A.C. 578- 579. 
46 (1970) S.C.R. 46, (1970) 1. C.C.C. 129, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 97 (1969). 
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'technical' arrest. An accused is either arrested or he is not" .. n In the case 
where a person accompanies a police officer of his own volition, he should 
be free to leave unless there exist grounds on the basis of which he will be, at 
least temporarily, deprived of the enjoyment of his right to freedom of 
movement. 48 The Commission also called for the introduction of a novel 
scheme used (generally) in Canada by the Ontario Police which simply 
involves a so called "appearance notice." It would allow the police to 
obtain appearance of the person at the station without actually arresting 
him. The Commission further recommended, that failure of appearance 
should be met with the same predicament_ that befalls any one who fails to 
answer to bail without the prior need of arrest. 49 Regrettably such a 
measure was not taken up. Rather the Act limited itself to asserting a 
person's possibility of leaving police custody unless he is technically put 
under arrest and informed as such at once. 50 
Actually, Section 29 can be seen as to impart a totally different picture 
altogether in practice. The police can ask a person down to the police 
station for a short conversation, and on going to the station willingly, under 
the impression that it is a short visit, the person concerned may still be there 
in 'conversation' for an unlimited period of time answering questio·ns 
without being formally arrested or charged. Section 29 may, therefore, in 
practice undermine the whole scope of the Act to regulate the period of a 
suspect's detention in police custody. 
Once again the legislator fills in a lacuna by doing away with what was 
a precarious situation but at the same stroke omits to provide any safeguard 
from any possible abuse by the investigating officers. As Professor Zander 
indicates, generally speaking a suspect would not know of his right to leave 
the station unless he is formally placed under arrest. In practice, therefore, 
a suspect will not take advantage of that right and by the time he is placed 
under arrest he may have prejudiced his position gravely. The learned writer 
suggests that the suspect should be told that despite his accompanying an 
officer to the station, this does not in any way imply that he is under 
arrest. 
The Royal Commiss1on recommends that upon arrest the person 
concerned should be·taken to the police station immediately. 52 Section 30 
of the Act caters for the implementation of such a proposal and indeed it 
marks the first occasion under the provisions of the new law whereby an 
arrested person is held in police detention. The section stipulates that a 
person on arrest must be taken to the station as soon as practicable. The 
station to which the arrested person is taken, must be a designated one and 
in cases where a person is not taken to such a designated police station he 
47 Vide 13 Ottawa L. Rev. (1981) 559. 
48 Report para. 3.97. 
49 Ibid para 3.80. 
50 Clause 29 paras. (a) & (b). 
51 Vide M. Zander on "P .C.E.B. - III: Arrest" m a series of articles explaining the 
various provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill at 133 N.L. Jnl. (1983) 246. 
52 Report para 3 .102. 
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shall be taken to one not more than six hours after his arrival to the first 
station. However, if the person is arrested by a constable not attached to a 
designated station, he may take the arrested person to any other "unless it 
appears to the constable that it may be necessary to keep the arrested person 
in police detention for more than six hours". 53 The act seems to take up the 
Commission's proposal of ensuring the possibility that arrested pesons 
should be taken to police stations where the enquiry is to be undertaken 54 
by the selection of certain designated stations. 55 However, it fails at such an 
early stage in the process of arrest to provide any safeguards or to impart 
some sort of explanation for the legislature's choice of a six-hour time 
limit. The only readily acceptable explanation, upon a first impression, is 
that it reflects the time limit proposed by the Royal Commission after the 
lapse of which and in cases where no charge is made, an officer not 
connected with the investigation of the particular case and preferably 
holding the rank of inspector should look into the case to satisfy himself 
whether the grounds for arrest still exist. 56 As far as section 30 is concerned 
one last point which deserves mention is the case where a constable sees fit 
to delay taking the arrested person to a police station if the latter's presence 
is required for investigation purposes at any other place. 57 This sub-clause 
undermines the immediacy of proceeding to a police station in the first 
place. It enables the police to take, what Professor Zander describes as "the 
scenic route to the police station''. 58 
Part IV of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act contains the main 
provisions purporting to codify the law on detention after the arrest of a 
person has taken place. As Lord Hutchinson of Lullington remarked, this 
segment of the new law represents ''the very centre and kernel of the 
Bill". 59 It lays down the principle that no person may be detained for an 
offence except insofar as the conditions stipulated are met with. It primarily 
provides for the appointment of custody officers at designated police 
stations as suggested in paragraph 3.112 of the Commission's Report, 
whose duty is the overall responsibility for the detention and the treatment 
of detainees as specified in the various provisions of the Act on detention. A 
detainee is entitled to be released if the grounds for his detention do not 
require his continued detention. If,however,it appears to the custody officer 
that there is need for further investigation of the offence in connection with 
which the person was detained, or that proceedings may be taken against 
that person then he shall be released only on bail unless it happens that he 
was seen to be unlawfully at large when first arrested, in which case he shall 
not be released at all. 60 
53 Section 30 (3). 
54 Report para. 3.102. 
55 Section 35 of the Act defines what is intended by 'designated police stations'. 
56 Report para. 3.104. 
57 Section 30 (10). 
58 N.L. Jnl. 1983 at pp. 246.
59 Vide House of Lords Debates Hansard 4/6/84 col. 465. 
60 Vide Section 34 (4). 
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Prior to the enactment of the new Act, as with other aspects of the 
criminal process such as arrest, the legal situation concerning persons in 
police detention was, to quote C. Munro, " ... in the absetlce of authority, 
for long notoriously unclear". Nevertheless, the general principle was 
that a person in police custody could notbe kept in detention for question­
ing, whether in the street or at the police station, unless arrested and 
brought before a Magistrates' Court within 24 hours from his detention in 
custody. Before the new provisions contained in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, the two main sources of law regulating a detainee's 
length of duration were, (i) rule 'B' of the Judges' Rules which laid down 
that "police officers, otherwise than by arrest, cannot compel any person 
against his will to come or to remain in a police station''. 62 The other 
provision by virtue of which a person could be detained is found in section 
43 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. It caters for the case where a person 
is taken into custody without a warrant and on being taken to the police 
station, is to be brought before a Magistrates' Court within 24 hours from the 
time when he was taken into custody unless an officer, at least holding the 
rank of an inspector or the officer in charge of the station to which he has 
been brought, shall inquire into the case and release him on bail if the 
offence is not a serious one, that is if it was not practicable to bring the 
person in custody before a Magistrate within 24 hours from the moment he 
was taken into custody. If, however, the person is retained in custody he 
must be taken before a Magistrates' Court as soon as practicable. Of 
course, this provision has now been abolished, and although a critical 
examination of its effects is indicative of the pitfalls and inadequacies of its 
practical application, it is only meant to represent the legal position as it 
stood prior to the 1984 Act. 
The main defects with such a provision are, that firstly it fails to define 
what is or may be considered a ''serious offence'' and secondly allows any 
decision to be taken, on the nature which the offence assumes, up to police 
discretion. Furthermore detention in cases of serious offences was open­
ended. As Munro adds, "where section 43 sub-section 1 of the Magistrates' 
Court Act does not cater for an unqualfied 24 hour limit, the tendency is to 
turn to sub-section 4 of that section and seek refuge in the application of a 
rule open to general interpretation, that arrested persons are to be brought 
before a court as soon as practicable". 63 The courts interpreted the latter 
phrase as to denote a period of not more than 48 hours duration. The same 
author implies that the English courts may have deduced such a time-limit 
from the same period of time stipulated under the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. 64 Munro further adds that the time-limit 
was a misconstruction produced by reading sub-sections I and 4 of 
section 43 of the Magistrates' Court Act in conjunction. Quoting from a 
61 Vide note by Munro on 'Police Detention' in Public Law (1982) at 210. 
62 Vide App. A of the H.O. Circular No. 89/1978. 
63 Op.cit. at pp. 211. 
64 Vide Houghton v Franciosy (1978) 68 Cr. App. R. 197; R v Hudson (1981) 72 Cr. App. 
R. 163 and in Re Sherman and Apps ( 1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 266, 271.
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recent case the writer points out that Lord Lane sitting in the Court of 
Appeal confirms, "that the particular section of the Magistrates' Court Act 
does not only not speak of 48 hours, yet there is no mention of 48 hours at 
all". 65 
By way of comparison, a 'peace officer' in Canada may arrest a person 
without warrant only if he has reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the suspect may have been or was about to commit an indictable 
offence. 66 Nevertheless, the arresting officer is required to bring the person 
arrested with or without a warrant, within 24 hours after the arrest before a 
judge and if a judge is not available, than as soon as practicable after 
that. 67 The flaw in this situation is that Canadian officers tend to take the 
arrested person to Court irrespective as to whether or not they have 
gathered enough evidence to secure a conviction. This gives rise to a high 
proportion of persons being detained unnecessarily. Consequently, it was 
suggested that the arrested person should be released from police custody if 
further investigation failed to produce enough evidence to justify his 
continued detention without the need to be brought capriciously before a 
judge. 68 
In the light of that Canadian proposal, the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act seeks to provide, having taken into consideration the 
Commission's comments on the issue, for a period of detention where 
police interrogation can be carried out after arrest has taken place, yet 
before any charge of an offence has been made against the arrested 
person. 69 The detention scheme in the Act embodies the necessity principle
which in practical terms allows the investigating officer to proceed to the 
continued detention of the arrested where it is expedient to do so in order to 
secure the evidence required for the charge of that person with an offence. 
However, as Professor Leigh notes in his report on the Royal Commission's 
work, the situation envisaged is to end abuses in a delicate area "by 
institutionalising the practice under controls". 70 
On arrival of the arrested person at the police station, the custody 
officer will see whether sufficient evidence is already available at that time 
to charge him with the offence for which he was arrested. If that evidence is 
lacking he may be kept for a period long enough to enable the investigating 
officer to secure that evidence. 71 The custody officer is to release the
arrested person without bail if no evidence is available. On the other hand 
he may again order the detention without charge of the detainee, if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing that his detention without charge is 
necessary to obtain or preserve the evidence, through further questioning 
65 In Mo/cherek and Steel (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 187. 
66 cf. Section 435 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 1982. 
67 Ibid. Section 438. 
68 Vide the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections. Toward Unity: Criminal
.Justice and Corrections, at pp.55 - 57, Information Canada, 1972. 
69 Prof. L.H. Leigh in his Memorandum on Evidence to the R.C.C.P. at p. 23. 
70 44 Mod. L.Rev. (1981) 300. 
71 Clause 37(1). 
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connected with the offence for which the detainee is arrested. 72 The Act at 
this stage, does not mention a time-limit for detaining a person. It only 
provides for the custody record to be kept wherein the grounds for. the 
detainee's further detention is noted, and even then, this is only carried out 
as soon as practicable. The detainee, if it is any consolation, has the right to 
be present when the record of his detention is noted down and he is also to 
be informed of the grounds for his detention. However, if he is incapable of 
understanding the custody officer, or is violent or likely to so become, or in 
urgent need of medical attention, his right to be told of the reasons for his 
detention shall not apply. It may seem, therefore that one's rights are done 
away with as easily as they were granted in the first place. Unfortunately the 
Act fails to provide a sub-clasue by virtue of which it would be possible for 
these rights to be merely suspended and brought back later into operation 
once the condition of the detainee improves. Nevertheless, at a certain point 
in time a person must be charged or released with or without bail. 73 If he is 
released without charge and at the time of his release a decision was not 
taken as to his prosecution on an offence for which he finds himself 
detained, he has a right to be so informed. The Act here carries out to the 
letter what the Royal Commission suggested. It does away with the half-way 
house situation, of determining whether or not a person is charged. 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act is the pointer on the law reform 
scale which marks, on the one hand, the precise point which previously 
reflected a totally chaotic situation of the law, very much in need of clarific­
ation, relating to the period of time spent by a suspect in police detention 
without charge. On the other hand, it reflects the statutory version of this 
detention period in the statute book; however, practice will show that the 
scope and effort made by the Act for its codification have failed to strike 
the intended balance. One consolatory remark is, however, provided by 
Professor Leigh. He states that proper statutory control of the period of 
arrest without charge is necessary in order to curb possible abuses of police 
powers. However, the quest for coming up with the ideal proposed structure 
whereby the police officers are given the minimum possibility of reasonably 
and adequately obtaining information from the public, yet at the same time 
securing the citizens' rights from what the learned writer terms 
"overbearing conduct", is, to say the least, utopian. 74 
Commenting on 'Modern Trends in the American Law of Arrest', 
Leon Radzinowicz and Cecil Turner, explain that a police officer is entitled 
to stop a person in the early hours of the morning, at a place where the 
latter's presence may within reason amount to implication in criminal 
involvement, without arresting or infringing that person's freedom of 
movement. The officer is entitled to follow such a suspect and ask him to 
explain his business abroad. ;5 The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
72 Ibid. para. (2). 
73 A person at the most can only be detained up to 24 hours, unless detention is further 
reviewed as provided by clauses 42 and 43. 
74 Memorandum on Evidence to the R.C. at p. 17. 
75 Vide op.cit. Vol. 20 Canadian Bar Review (1943) 205. 
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Procedure proposed by the American Law Institute in 1966 suggested a 
brief on the spot detention of persons found in suspicious circumstances or 
reasonably suspected of having committed or being about to commit a 
serious offence. 76 Detention of the suspect would be authorised only if it is 
necessary: (i) to obtain that person's identification; (ii) to verify that 
identification; (iii) to provide an alibi for his presence at the time of com­
mission of the offence and (iv) to request that person to furnish information 
or co-operate with the investigation of the offence. A limit of twenty minutes 
was proposed, after which the suspect cannot be compelled to stay in or 
near the place of the crime. Thereafter he is free to leave unless arrested. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission on Criminal Investigation 
proposed a similar measure which would enable the police to ask for a 
person's name and address if they reasonably believe that the person would 
be able to help them in their inquiries into the commission of an offence. 77 
The whole scope of these proposals for reform is to cut down as much 
as possible on long periods of detention in police custody and to avoid if 
possible police harassment of questioned persons. As attractive as much 
measures seem to be on first impression, they are far from watertight. 78 
One preoccupying factor which undermines the whole aim behind the 
measures, is that to a large extent they depend on the application of the 
"reasonable" test. "Reasonable cause is a nebulous standard; it depends on 
what the suspect is seen or reported to have done, taken without the relevant 
circumstances, but in a doubtful case weight, perhaps undue weight, may be 
given to circumstances which are not particular to the suspect". 79 
In blissful ignorance of, and with little apprehension to the pitfalls of 
the 'reasonable cause' standard, clause 38 of the Act provides that a person 
who is arrested other than by a warrant endorsed for bail and not being a 
juvenile shall not be released if: 
1. his name or address could not be ascertained or where the custody
officer has reasonable doubts in believing whether the particulars given by 
him were true. 
2. his continued detention is necessary where the custody officer has
reasonable grounds for believing it to be safer for the detainee's self­
protection or for preventing him from causing harm or damage to property. 
3. the custody officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the
arrested person will fail to answer to bail or his detention will stop him from 
interfering with witnesses or the course of justice. 
If, on the.other hand, the arrested person is a juvenile, it shall be sufficient 
if any one of the above three requirements is satisfied or further still if the 
officer again has reasonable grounds for believing the juvenile to be better 
off, "for his own interests", in police custody. The detained person kept in 
custody by virtue of this clause has the same rights as when he first arrived 
76 Vide Section 2.02 of the proposed Code. 
77 Report (Interim) 1975 para. 80. 
78 Vide Professor Leigh's discussion at pp. 17 -24 of his Memo. on Evidence. 
79 L.H. Leight at p. 299 Vol. 44 Mod. L. Rev. 1981.
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at the police station, namely, to be informed of his continued detention and 
the reasons therefor, together with the custody officer's duty to make note 
of them in the custody record in the detainee's presence. The situation is, 
however, far from satisfactory. The questions that follow are: by what 
standards is the custody officer to determine the significance of the 
detainee's "own interests" or his protection? How should the truth or 
falsity of one's own particulars be determined? And how will the criteria for 
a prolonged detention, necessary for the prevention of any tampering with 
the administration of justice, be tailored? Above all, decisions affecting a 
person's restriction of liberty are left up to a custody officer, without any 
mention whatsoever of judicial intervention. 80 
The relevant section of the Act which most affects the initial stages of a 
detainee's liberty is section 40, concerning itself with the reviews of 
detention periods while in police custody. The Royal Commission, on the 
basis of research evidence, undertaken on its behalf and relating to police 
practice, concludes that 6 and 24 hour review periods are likely to be 
satisfactory to supervise internal and external conduct of police discretion 
in the detention of a suspect. 81 The Act faithfully follows the Commission's 
proposals, and it does clarify the situation in certain respects. However, it 
negatives its own merits in the sense that, in its attempt to provide clarity it 
has enacted rather discretionary grounds on which prolonged detention of 
the arrested person is asserted. Clause 40, first of all clarifies the previous 
position of detention without charge as it equally applies to an arrested and 
charged person, and to a person arrested though not yet charged, by an 
officer of at least the rank of an inspector. The first review of detention 
comes after the first 6 hours spent in detention and then detention is 
reviewed again 9 hours later and subsequently at 9 hour intervals. However, 
not all reform is a step in the right direction. 
The Act, typically conveys the impression of giving rights and curtailing, 
if not abrogating them with a stroke of the same pen. Sub-section 4 of this 
section allows postponement of a review on extremely flexible and 
discretionary grounds. The latter are: (i) if it is not practicable to carry out 
the review at the particular time when the review is due; (ii) where the review 
officer at that time considers harmful the interruption of questioning by the 
investigating officer for the purposes of review as it may prejudice the 
entire investigation; finally, (iii) the review will also be postponed 
"if no review officer is readily available". 82 As Geraldine Van Bueren 
opines, such grounds for allowing postponement of detention reviews 
would appear to deprive individuals of their liberty for the purposes of 
administrative convenience. 83 
80 Vide comments made by the H.O. Briefing Guide on the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Bill published in 1983 at pp. 35 -38. 
81 Report para. 3.105. 
82 Section 40 sub-section (4b ii). 
83 "Once more unto Strasbourg" L.A.G. Bulletin 1983 at p. 10. 
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Such grounds for postponement beg the question. What is the purpose 
of establishing review periods in the first place? It may not seem to be 
altogether difficult to appreciate Lord Morris's comment in the House of 
Lords debate on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, when he remarked 
"whenever a Bill grants a power to an individual or group of people and it 
also contains safeguards against the· abuse of that power then the 
fundamental question we must eternally be asking ourselves is, 'is that 
power as it is designed in the Bill absolutely necessary?' If there have to be 
safeguards against that power one must ask oneself, why have the power in 
the first place?" 84 Nevertheless, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act does 
introduce a fundamental safeguard which will play a vital role when the new 
law is applied in practice. It expressly engraved into the statute book that, 
before a person's continued detention is authorised by the review officer, 
the detainee or his solicitor may make representations relating to the 
detention. These representations may be made orally or in writing, athough 
they may be refused in the former form if it is considered by the review 
officer that the suspsect is unfit to do them, due to his condition or 
behaviour. The Act therefore, does give statutory status to the period of 
questioning by police officers of a suspect in their custody without charge. 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that "overbearing conduct is not 
necessarily a function either of powers or of lack of powers". 85 Therefore, 
the presence of a solicitor during such a period is more than welcome. 86 
The 24 hours detention limit proposed by the Commission was also 
taken up by the Act's legislators and clause 41 limits any officer in with­
holding a suspect in detention for more than 24 hours without charge. The 
Commission was rather cautious in indicating which moments in time 
should mark the .beginning and the end of a detention period. Problems 
would arise where arrests take place outside police stations, but the 
Commission decided in favour of the point where the arrested person 
arrives at a police station as being the start of his proper detention and from 
which the 24 hours are to be calculated. Section 41 further stipulates that a 
person's detention period is to start either from the moment he arrives at the 
station or from the lapse of 24 hours after arrest whichever is the earlier, 
and as such does not allow for a period to develop where the person is 
although arrested yet not detained and consquently the suspect may spend 
far more than 24 hours before being charged. The Act further dismisses any 
time spent by the accused travelling to hospital, if in need of medical 
treatment; during his stay in hospital and on his way back to the police 
station as being part of the 24 hour limit, unless he was being questioned by 
the police during that time. This provision is not altogether unreasonable. It 
84 House of Lords Debates Weekly Hansard 4/6/84 col. 440. 
85 Leigh Memo. on Evidence at pp. 22. 
86 Prior to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act a detainee's contact with a solicitor was 
by means of a telephone call, and only where no hindrance was reasonably likely to be 
caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice. Vide App. B. on 
Administrative Directions on Interrogation and the 'Taking of Statements in H.O. 
Circular No. 89/1978. 
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can be considered as a corollary of the principle that a person is questioned 
during detention without charge, a corollary which although seems logical 
but may equally be disagreeable. In fact it may show the. Act to be in the 
critical light viewed by Mr. S. Best. The writer urgued that the provisions 
of the Bill on detention were ''nothing more than an endorsement of the 
long standing claim by the police to detain persons for up to 24 hours 
without charge and without having the sanction of the Courts as they de 
facto do at present". 87 The author adds that the suspect's rights would be 
further eroded on the applications sought by the police to extend the 24 
hour period without charge and without much preoccupation given by the 
Magistrates' official rubber-stamping of those applications. 
The Commission, in fact, did recommend an extension of the 24 hour 
time-limit upon recourse by application to the Magistrates' Court. 
However, it suggested that this period should be limited in its use only in 
cases of grave and serious offences. To the same effect, Professor Leigh 
contends that although police interrogation is relatively infrequent, yet it is 
found necessary in cases of great complexity, or cases involving organised 
crime where a number of suspects are involved and there is danger of 
violence being caused to witnesses or the destruction of evidence. 88 In its 
Report the Commission had in mind a complex situation where statements 
or information given by the detainee have to be checked in the light of 
forensic findings. A task in itself which takes quite some time to verify. 89 
The Act, however, goes much further than the Commission's proposals 
regarding the extension of the 24 hour period for questioning. If a police 
officer holding the rank of superintendent or above, who is responsible for 
the station where the arrested person is detained, has reasonable grounds to 
believe that: 
(i) that person's detention without charge is necesary to secure or
preserve evidence.relating to the offence for which he is kept under arrest or 
to obtain that evidence by questioning him; 
(ii) if the offence for which he is arrested is a serious arrestable
offence; 
(iii) if the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously,
that officer has the authority to order the continued detention of a suspect 
for a period expiring at or before 36 hours from the beginning of the 
detention. If, however, he authorises it for less than 36 hours, he may again 
authorise a further period, expiring not more than 36 hours after the 
relevant time and as long as the same three grounds still subsist. 90 There­
fore, the situation contemplated by the Commission, where a suspect is 
brought before a Magistrate after 24 hours, has been modified by making it 
quite possible if the conditions subsist, for a suspect to be kept in detention 
87 Vid Vol. 125 Solicitors' Jnl. 1981 at pp. 71. 
88 Professor Leigh's comments were made prior to the report issued by the R.C.C.P., 
further still, prior to the enactment of the Act and to that extent should be considered in 
that light. Vide his Memo. on Evidence at pp. 24 -25. 
89 Report para. 3.06. 
90 Clause 42 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 
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for up to 36 hours without charge. Once again the Act leaves it up to police 
officers to determine, on applying their powers of reasonableness, whether 
further interrogation is necessary to secure evidence or whether the con­
tinued detention is necessary where the investigation is being conducted 
diligently and expeditiously. Although, it does seem to be rather awkward 
to re�oncile the need felt, on reasonable grounds, to prolong a person
,
s 
detention period where the reason for his presence in that situation is being 
dealt with expeditiously. However, with regard to serious arrestable 
offences, the Act only provides clarification by way of enumeration rather 
than by way of definition. It lists a number of crimes in schedule 5 to the 
law; a number of offences mentioned in the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, and includes any act or threat, if it had 
to be carried out, which leads or is likely to lead to any of the following 
consequences: (1) serious harm to the security of the State or to public 
order; (2) serious interference with the administration of justice or with the 
investigation of offences or of a particular offence; (3) the death of any 
person; (4) serious injury to any person; (5) substantial financial gain to any 
person; and (6) serious financial loss to any person. The Act goes on to 
explain that loss is serious if it is serious to the person who suffers it, an 
explanation which does not take us very far in determining what degree of 
seriousness it really is. 91 
The Act does on the whole, put in some effort to strike a balance in 
order to safeguard the detainee
,
s right during his second stage of further 
detention. Section 42 goes on to state that he may not be subject to further 
detention on the expiry of the first 24 hours nor at least before the second 
review of the first phase of the detention. He also has the right to be 
informed of the grounds for his continued detention. More important, once 
again, is his right to make representations about the detention. At this point 
a solicitor is once again available and the detainee has also the right to 
inform a third party about his detention. However comforting these rights 
may be, there is more here than meets the eye. The detainee may have spent 
up to 36 hours without being charged; may have seen a lawyer when it was 
too late; and his position may already have been gravely prejudiced. In 
addition his rights to legal advice and to inform a third party may be refused 
by the officer who authorised his continued detention up to 36 hours from 
the moment of detention at the station. In this light, it would be frivolous to 
claim that the. suspect's position is safeguarded 92 by the fact that the 
91 Cf. clause 116(7) of the Act. . 
92 Professor Leigh confirms the scepticism which the exercise of the arrested person's right 
to seek legal advice and the right to inform a third party, attract when they are con­
sidered in the circumstances explained. He writes " ... vu de cet angle, la legislation 
anglaise est fortement critiquable. II est vrai qu'elle donne au suspect le droit de 
contacter sa famille et a !'assistance d'un juriste. Mais ii est vrai aussi que la police peut, 
pendent une periode de 36 heures, le tenir incommunicado si elle l'estime necessaire pour 
les besoins de l'enquete." vide Leigh's article, entitled "Observations sur une reforme 
fondamentale a la procedure penale anglaise: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984", 
to appear in 1985 in the Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie. 
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authorising officer is duty bound to take note of the decision and the 
grounds therefor, in the custody record. Furthermore, the fact that the 
detainee must be released with or without bail not later than 36 hours since 
the beginning of his detention, i.e. unless he is either charged with an 
offence or detained up to the maximum period of 96 hours, does not, to say 
the least, seem to be very assuring. 
'Detention-time' does not stop here. On an application substantiated 
with information and made on oath by a constable before a Magistrate's 
Court, a warrant of further detention may be issued by the Court if it 
believes that there exists reasonable grounds warranting that extended 
detention. Although an element of judicial review finally creeps into the 
process of police investigation, it is certainly not the classical case of better 
being late than never. The grounds upon which further detention is to be 
granted, are identical to those where the suspect may be detained up to 36 
hours from the relevant time. The indication is quite clear that the legislator 
puts on the same footing an authorisation for further detention by a senior 
police officer as that to be made by a judicial officer, presumably under the 
long overdue guise of bringing the detainee before a court of law as 
recommended by the Commission. The information submitted in the 
application must state: 
(1) the nature of the offence for which the person's extended detention
is sought; 
(2) the general nature of the evidence on which that person was
arrested; 
(3) the inquiries made and proposed to be made by the police relating
to the offence; and 
(4) the reasons for believing the continued detention to be necessary.
The application may be made either before the 36 hour period expires,
or during a period of the first 6 hours after the expiry of the 36 hours, where 
the Magistrates' Court could only sit during those 6 hours if it was not 
practicable for the Court to sit immediately upon the expiry of the 36 hours 
from the relevant time. If, however, the application is made beyond the 36 
hour period the court may refuse to issue the warrant if it reasonably 
believes that it could have been filed earlier. In such a case the detainee is 
still to be kept in detention during adjournment and the custody officer 
shall have to report the continued detention and the reason tqerefor, until 
the application is heard. If, on the other hand, the application is granted, 
the warrant shall state the time of its issue, authorise the continued 
detention and shall not be for a period exceeding 36 hours. In practical 
terms this means that, it is quite possible for a detainee to spend up to 72 
hours without being charged and so held incommunicado, possibly without 
the right to see his solicitor until his appearance in court and 94 without 
93 Sub-section 10 of section 42. 
94 Section 43(2) and (3), however, allow the arrested person to be present in court and 
legally represented and furnished with a copy of the information relating to the 
application for his extended detention. 
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informing any relatives or friends of his whereabouts and state of health. 95 
In this respect it is hard to appreciate the conviction with which the Lord 
Chancellor claims that the whole philosophy of the Act is to provide clarity, 
workability and above all, balance, in the interest of freedom under the 
law. 96 
Furthermore if the Magistrate's Court is not satisfied with the existence 
of the conditions necessary for extending the period, it has the option of 
either dismissing the application or adjourning the hearing of the 
application for a period not longer than 36 hours after the relevant time. 
Rather than catering for an outright dismissal of the application, the Act 
allows for the detainee to be kept up to the end of the 36 hours after the 
relevant time as sub-section 9 of section 43 points out, "that during the 
adjournment the arrested person may be kept in police detention." If, on 
the other hand, the application were to be dismissed, the detainee's right to 
immediate release with or without bail unless charged, is not a foregone 
conclusion. If the arrested person was detained for a period of less than 36 
hours after the relevant time or in any other case the application under 
Section 43 is made before the expiry of 24 hours after the relevant time, he 
shall not be released even if the application was dismissed. The end to a 
person's detention without charge is far from near. It is possible for a 
constable to file a new application supported with information to ask a 
Magistrates' Court to extend once again the detention period now possibly 
in its 72nd hour for an exrra 24 hour period of detention, which cannot, 
therefore, end later than 96 hours since the person first arrived at the 
police station. 97 
In the light of these provisions, the equilibrium between the conduct 
and behaviour of two entities within a larger one, namely society, as a 
community, is hardly visible let alone maintained. Safeguards will receive 
legislative force with pyrrhic effect when translated into practice and are far 
from adequate. In addition to an already unsatisfactory state of affairs, the 
Act refrains from any mention of the suspect's right to remain silent during 
questioning, a right absolutely necessary once the law seek to elevate 
the concept of detention without charge to the statute book. 
'Right to Silence' 
The right to remain silent during police questioning did not receive any 
consideration by the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report 
on evidence in criminal cases. 98 However, it did come under the critical lens 
95 Section 42 (9) stipulates that if a detainee is held up to 36 hours after the relevant time 
and at the time of the extension of his detention, he had not exercised his right to see his 
solicitor and to inform a third party, the officer authorising the extension of his 
detention may•refuse him these rights. Vide sections 56 and 58 for the conditions on 
which the authorising officer may refuse these rights. 
96 Vide House of Lords Debates of the 4/6/1984. 
97 Cf. Section 44. 
98 Command 4991 ( 1972) for an extensive discussion vide "The Right of Silence in the 
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of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. 99 Nevertheless, it is 
unfortunate that the legislators of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
chose on this occasion to follow in the footsteps of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee and consequently the right against self-incrimination 
finds no statutory provision in the new law. It is only therefore, the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure which concerns itself with 
the question as to whether the detainee should be told during interrogation 
of his rights not to answer any questions put to him and if he chooses to do 
so of his own volition, they may be brought as evidence in court. The Royal 
Commission was faced with the difficulty of reconciling two different views 
that emanated as a result of the debatable recommendations of the Criminal 
Law Revision Committee which suggested a substantial alteration of the 
legal implications involved in the right to silence. The two sides to the issue, 
reflecting the everlasting debate on the balance of powers, advocated the 
preservation of the principles of presumption of innocence and onus of 
proof on the. one hand and on the other, the administration of justice as 
being a means to an end in bringing the guilty to trial. 
The common law position on the right to silence is epitomised by Lord 
Devlin's dictum that a person's duty to assist the police is a social and moral 
one but not a legal duty. The whole basis of the common law is the right of 
the individual to refuse to answer any questions at all put to him by persons 
in authority. 100 However, the position radically changes once the suspect is 
arrested and taken into detention. The detainee must be submitted to 
questioning (particularly in the light of the provisions of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act) although he may still remain silent. However, as 
Professor Leigh observes "the real issue is whether and to what extent 
inferences can be drawn against him from his silence''. 101 The Commission 
indicates that during interrogation no inference could be drawn as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused from his silence. However, it was found 
that juries would draw inferences in suspicious circumstances where the 
arrested refused to explain or answer certain questions. With this in mind 
the Commission came to the conclusion that it would not suggest that an 
inference should be made from a detainee's silence as it would not change 
the position in practice and therefore decided to leave the legal situation as 
it stands at present. 102 
The Commission felt, that the legal position was therefore satisfactory 
and that the caution enunciated in Rule III of the Judges' Rules was 
sufficient, except for a few changes that were necessary. First of all it 
proposed that the suspect should be cautioned at a moment much earlier in 
time than when he is usually cautioned in practice. The implication is that 
police wait until they have evidence which gives rise to reasonable grounds 
Police Station and the Caution" by M. Zander in "Re.shaping the Criminal Law" Ed. by 
P.R. Glazebrook, (1978). 
99 Command 8092 (1980). 
100 Rice v Conolly (1966) 2 Q.B. 414. 
101 Memo. on Evidence to R.C. at p. 63. 
102 Report para. 4.48. 
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for suspecting that person of committing an offence. The caution should 
tell the suspect that he is going to be questioned and that he has no need to 
reply but if he decides to and is later prosecuted, anything he may have said 
will be reported in Court. 103 This, in a nutshell, is the proposal which the 
Commission recommended for reform. Actually the report, although it 
deals considerably with the topic, had a negative effect. It found other 
proposals for reform to be unconvincing and came to the conclusion that 
the situation as it stood was acceptable. The Commission could in this regard 
only be guilty of an omission rather than of having committed a wrong, an 
accusation which equally may very well be directed to the legislators of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Similarly unconvincing are Lord Elton's 
comments during the opening debate of the second reading of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Bill in the House of Lords. His Lordship held that the 
Bill reinforces the right to silence substantiated solely by the introduction of 
certain codes of practice intended to ensure that detained persons are made 
aware of their safeguards and rights under the new law. 104 As emphatically 
put by Lord Hooson in that same debate, ''it would be a bad day for the 
country if the boy in the famous painting was under a legal obligation to 
reply to the infamous question", 'when did you last see your father?' and 
could be made, by one means or the other to answer. On that kind of fasue 
there can be no compromise. It is not a question of balance then; it is a 
question of fundamental principle". 105 
Admissibility of Confessions 
One area of law regulating crime investigation, which has had an 
effective impact on securing that "fundamental principle" of the right to 
silence has been the admissibility of confessions or statements made by the 
accused during custody. The classic exposition of the rules governing the 
admissibility of statements is found in Ibrahim v R. 106 Lord Sumner held 
that '�it has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, 
that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless 
it is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the 
sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or 
of hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority''. 107 
Hence, the development in English common law of the voluntary rule, 
subsequently confirmed by principle 'e' in the preamble to the Judges' 
Rules 10s and a string of judicial decisions. However, the Judges' Rules 
103 Report para. 4.57. 
104 House of Lords Hansard 4/6/1984 col. 476.
105 House of Lords Hansard 4/6/1984 col. 416.
106 (1914) A.C. 599. 
107 For an historical survey of the development of the rule as applied to persons prior to and
after detention in police custody - vide Leigh "Police Powers in England and Wales"
1975 at p. 143 et seq. 
108 H.O. Circular No; 89/1978 states "That it is a fundamental condition of the
admissibility in evidence against any person, equally of any oral answer given by that
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introduced the new notion of 'oppression', which added a new dimension to 
the issue, in the sense that it was questioned whether 'voluntariness' and 
'oppression' were synonymous. The cases of Collis v Gunn 109 and R v 
Praeger 110 confirmed that there was no distinction between the two 
concepts. The most recent authoritative case on the subject is D.P.P. v Ping 
Lin. m The House of Lords confirmed that the issue whether a statement 
was voluntary or not was basically one of fact. R v Hudson 112 reaffirmed 
the notion of oppression as amounting to an involuntary statement was to 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Furthermore Wong 
Kam-Ming v The Queen 113 and again in R v Brophy 114 the House of Lords 
held that a detainee in custody had the right to enjoy a total freedom in 
giving evidence during the 'voire' dire' without affecting in any way his 
right to silence during the substantive trial. However, the latest iudicial 
decision, R v Rennie 115 is seen at the beginning of a development sending 
to restrict the interpretation of the voluntary rule by the courts. The case 
was decided in the Court of Appeal where the appellant was convicted on 
obtaining pecuniary gain by deception, alleged that his confession was made 
in the hope that by giving in to police questioning they would not implicate 
his relatives by taking steps against them. The Court held, per Lord Lane, 
that often the motives of an accused person are mixed and include a hope 
that an early decision may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If 
it were the law that the mere presence of such a motive, even if prompted by 
something said or done by a person in authority, led inexorably to the 
exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession would be rendered 
inadmissible. The essence as Professor Leigh points out, is that the 'root 
question in every case is whether the admission was voluntary'. 116 
With a view of ascertaining precisely whether the under]ying rationale 
of the principle of voluntariness is whether to control interrogation prac­
tices, protect the legitimate interests of the accused, provide reliable 
evidence, or any combination of these justifications, particularly in the light 
of the decision by the Court of Appeal in R v Rennie. Mr. Smith claims the 
impossibility of predicting on which basis the admissibility of confessional 
statements will in future be determined by the courts and hence advocates 
swift clarificatory action. 117 
The Royal Commission does not categorically and specifically deal 
person to a question put by a police officer and of any statement made by that person, 
that is shall have been voluntary, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him by 
fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority, or 
by oppression." 
109 (1964) 1 Q.B. 495. 
110 (1972) 1 All. E.R. 114 & 45 Mod. L.R. (1982) 575. 
111 (1976) A.C. 574. 
112 (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 163 and (1981) C.L.R. 107. 
113 (1980) A.C. 247, 261. 
114 (1981) C.L.R. 831 & in 45 Jn. of Criminal Law 1981, 211. 
115 (1982) 1 All E.R. 385 & 1 W.L.R. 64. 
116 "Police Powers in England and Wales" at p. 145. 
117 45 Mod. L. Rev. (1982) 577. 
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with the admissibility of confessions under a separate heading. It advised 
against the existing framework of the Judges' Rules if "the maximum 
possible reliance for evidential purposes can be placed upon suspects' 
statements." It also recommended instead, that proposals of reform should 
be on the lines of police training schemes dealing with interviewing. 
Furthermore in the eventual implementation of such schemes the Commis­
sion took one bold step by recommending that the reliability of the con­
fessional evidence should be left to be determined by the jury and Magistrates, 
upon the facts presented to them. 118 It may be worthwile to point out in this 
regard that whereas the position in England, by virtue of the Judges' Rules 
the discretion of the admissibility or otherwise of confessional statements 
lies at the judicial level, 119 the position in Scotland 120 shifted from judicial 
to jury discretion with the case of Chalmers 121 in 1954 to a more liberal 
acceptance of statements in Miln v Cullen 122 and Murphy v H.M.
Advocate. 123 
The implementation of the guidelines mentioned by the Commission 
comes in the form of a Draft Code of Practice, issued by the Home Office 
on the Detention, Treatment, Questioning and Identification of persons by 
the Police and for Searching of Premises and Seizure of Property. The Code 
suggests amendments to the taking down of statements as laid down in the 
Judges' Rules 124 and takes up the Commission's ideas on improving note­
taking practice. 12s The latter reform is worded very subjectively and above all 
reflects the tedious burden of having to make notes in custody records. 
Nevertheless, even this practice may be stopped if it appears to the inter­
viewing officer that such a measure could interf et:e with the conduct of the 
interview. This provsion transfers discretionary power into the hands of the 
police and according to Mirfield "even in such remote circumstances, the 
court would be unlikely to exercise its discretion to exclude incriminating 
statements by virtue of section 76(3) of the Act. 126 In addition to a situation 
permeateq with discretion, apprehension is also directed to the accuracy of 
118 Report para. 4.75. 
119 Vide Leigh on "Police Powers in England and Wales" at p. 142; vide also the case of 
Dansie v Kelly: ExParte Dansie (1981) Qd. RI. Where the Supreme Court of Queensland 
dealt with judge's discretion is exerciseable in regard to the question of fact whether the 
confessional statement was voluntary or otherwise. Vide also Vol. 56 Australian Law 
Jnl. (1982) 247. For a succinct review of Australian Law on confessional statements vide 
paper presented by Mr. Johnston to the A.B.A. in Vol 54 Australian Law Jnl. (1980) 
466. 
120 Vide "The Admissibility of Answers to Police Questioning in Scotland" by G.H. 
Gordon an essay in "Reshaping the Criminal Law" ed. by P.R. Glazebrook, 1978. 
121 J.C. 66. 
122 1967 J.C. 21. 
123 1975 S.L.T. 17. 
124 See paras. 13.5 (d) and 13.6 of the H.0. Draft Code. 
125 Report of Commission paras. 4.12 to 4.15. 
126 vide "The Future of the Law of Confessions" C.L.R. 1984 at 64. However, it is 
interesting to point out that a new provision which will have novel effects when put to 
practice, has been inserted in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984. Section 78 will 
ease the apprehension foreseen by Dr. Mirfield with respect to the judicil reluctance in 
exercising discretionary powers to exclude inadmissible statements. It is a provision 
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the record to be kept by the Police. m The Commission having been aware 
of such growing concern 128 considers the feasibility of tape-recording 
interviews, which the Act actually takes up in Section 60 and goes to the 
extent of burdening the Secretary of State with a duty to issue a Code of 
practice on tape-recording interviews. This innovation goes to show that the 
advantages in its implementation would seem to outweigh its disadvan­
tages. The Commission also went as far as to consider the feasibility of 
introducing video-recordings of police questioning, a measure which 
undoubtedly would go a long way to help ascertain the voluntariness of a 
statement and would also have an immense deterring effect on police 
conduct during detention periods. Nevertheless, financial questions over­
shadow any possibilities of this proposal's implementation in the immediate 
future. 130 
With reference to the voluntariness rule, the Commission went as far as 
to suggest its total dismissal. It based its conclusion in the light of the con­
flicting case-law as to what constitutes a violation of the voluntary nature of 
a statement. The Commission also based its decisions on the results of a 
research study carried out by B. Irving 131 which suggested that in psycho­
logical terms custody in itself and questioning in custody develop forces 
upon many suspects which so affect their minds that their wills crumble and 
they speak when otherwise they would have stayed silent.ml On the basis of 
the findings, the Commission, although aware of the need to exercise 
control on police interrogation, opted for the view that it would be better to 
concentrate on the behaviour of the police rather than to purpose ''the vain 
attempt to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary confession". 
This is why it proposed the introduction of police interrogation guidelines 
mentioned earlier. The Act does not concur with the Royal Commission on 
the abolition of the voluntary rule, 134 and rightly so, although it does give 
the Secretary of State power to make delegated legislation; that is the draft 
codes of practice recommended by the Commission. Therefore, if a con­
fession made by an accused is tendered in court by the prosecution, it shall 
be dismissed if it is shown to the court that it was obtained (i) by oppression 
or (ii) in consequence of anything said or done which in the circumstances, 
which goes beyond the exclusion of irregularly obtained statements. Section 78 purports 
to empower the Court to exclude all evidence which considering all the circumstances, 
including those in which the evidence was obtained, would have an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings. A section which seems to undermine the rules regulating the 
admissibility of confessions and will give defence counsels the opportunity to make a lot 
of mileage in support of their.casue. 
127 "The Future of the Law of Confessions" C.L.R. 1984 at 64. 
128 Report paras. 4.2. to 4.11. 
129 Report paras. 4.16 to 4.30 and vide problems posed by Leigh in Memo. on Evidence to 
R.C.C.P. at pp. 68.
130 Report para. 4.31. 
131 "Police Interrogation: A Case Study of Current Practice" R.C. Research Study No. 2, 
1980. 
132 Report para. 4.73. 
133 M. Zander in N.L. Jnl. 133 (1983) 367. 
134 Clause 76 (2). 
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Although under ground (i) there is an echo of the notion of oppression 
introduced by the Judges' Rules, the Act adds to it by defining the notion as 
to include "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the use of threat 
of violence whether or not amounting to torture". 135 Clearly this is a case 
of phraseology borrowed from article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which stipulates that "no one shall be subject to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'' As Mirfield observes 136 
it is presumed that English courts will interpret ''the provision in the light of 
the European Convention, although they would not be bound to do so". 137 
The second ground which the Act provides for the inadmissibility of a 
confession is the ''test of reliability''. A standard of proof, was set out in 
clause 2(2) (b) of the Draft Bill proposed by the 11th Report of the Criminal 
Law Revision Committee. Yet, in the latter draft clause an added ingredient 
is found in the words " .... in the consequence of any threat or inducement 
of a sort likely .... ," which is omitted in the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1984. In Mirfield's view this ommission is a revolutionary measure 
which expands the width of the 'reliability test' so much that it would 
prejudice any consideration as to whether a confession is reliably obtained, 
particularly in the light of Irving's research for the Commission on the 
rigorous techniques of police investigation. This uncertainty would most 
likely necessitate frequent judicial intervention. 13s Therefore, if on the 
basis of the law as stipulated in the Act, the judge were now to address 
himself to the question of reliability, the question to be asked is not whether 
the confession is unreliable, but whether it may, be so in consequence of 
anything said or done during detention by the police, which in the circum­
stances, was likely to render it inadmissible. Furthermore, this would lead 
to situations where, if the judge would come to a decision that a confession 
obtained in those circumstances was actually unreliable, then it shall be 
dismissed outrightly even if it were true, unless, of course, the prosecution 
succeeds to prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, it is 
stipulated in the Act that the dismissal in part or in whole of a statement 
shall not prejudice the admission of any facts discovered by virtue of that 
statement nor where it is demonstrative of particular mannerisms or 
individual characteristics of the accused. In addition evidence as to how 
these facts were discovered must be adduced either by the accused himself 
or on his behalf. 
Two important rights of the arrested which may help minimise the 
effect of police interrogation provoking dubious and unreliable statements, 
135 Clause 76 ( 8). 
136 Op.cit. from fn 125 at pp. 69. 
137 It is pointed out however by G. Van Bueren that in so far as section 55 is concerned, the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Bill (No. 303) goes against England's commitment to 
international obligations and violates article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights ; Vide L.A.G. Bulletin 1983, 10; vide however also Tyer v U.K. in Vol. 2 Eur. 
Rep. 9-12, &lrelandv U.K. Vol. 2Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 , 73-85. 
138 Vide op.cit. at fn. 125 at pp. 70. 
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are dealt with in Part V of the Act on the Questioning and Treatment of 
Persons by the Police. They refer to the right to have someone informed of 
the suspect's arrest 139 and the right to have access to legal advice. 140 
Right to Inform a Third Party 
Prior to Section 56 of the Act, the basis upon which the right to have 
someone informed was founded,on (i) administrative direction no. 7 (a) of 
the Judges' Rules which allows an arrested person in custody to telephone 
his friends as long as no hindrance is likely to be caused to the process of 
investigation, (ii) the second basis from which is derived the right to have 
someone informed of one's detention under English Law, is Section 62 of 
the Criminal Law Act, 1977. This section provides that a person under 
arrest has the right to inform one person, named by him, without delay 
unless delay is necessary as not to interfere with the investigation or 
prosecution of crime. The Commission recommended the confirmation of 
section 62 together with the retention of the guidelines set out in adminis­
trative rule No. 7a of the Judges' Rules. The Act follows suit by providing 
that an arrested person is entitled upon his own request to have someone 
told of his detention. In this respect, the Act improves the position by 
expanding on the notion of a friend or relative or other person known or 
likeiy to take an interest in the welfare of the detainee. Such right should be 
exercised as soon as practicable except on grounds where delay is allowed. 
The Draft Code of Questioning also makes provision for the detainee to 
nominate two alternative persons in case the first one cannot be con­
tacted. 141 A similar provision is found in the American Law Institute's 
Proposed Draft Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure where an arrested 
person shall be given reasonable opportunity from time to time to consult 
with a relative or friend. It must be pointed out, however, that this 
provision is directed more towards the situation where a friend substitutes 
for a solicitor. 142 
Delay in granting the request to inform a third party arises in the case 
of a person arrested for a serious arrestable offence and if a superintendent 
authorises it. The reasons for the delay, as the Commission observed, 143 are
to prevent any harm done or interference with evidence connected with the 
serious offences; to prevent the detainee from alerting his associates and 
providing them with the opportunity to destroy, conceal or distort evidence; 
cause harassment to witnesses and, most important of all, escape prosecu­
tion. 044> In any case once the particular ground warranting delay ceases 
to exist the right shall be applicable afresh. Above all the detainee has the 
139 Section S6. 
140 Section S8.
141 Draft Code of Questioning para. 4.1. 
142 Op.cit. Section 5.07 at p. 47. 
143 Report para. 4.80. 
(144) It is of particular interest to note the apprehension which Prof. Leigh employs in his
comments with respect to the justifications given by the Commission, for the grounds
allowing for a delay in the exercise of a suspect's right to seek legal advice and to inform
a third party of his arrest. Prof. Leigh wriies, ''La police nous donne a penser que parmi
les juristes, certains peuvent etre de connivence avec le suspect, et done avec le milieu de
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right to be told of the reason for the delay and such reason shall be recorded 
in the custody record. This right is renewable every time the arrested person 
is transferred from one police station to another. The right, however, must 
be exercised before the expiry of 36 hours from when his period of detention 
commences. However, in the case of persons detained under the Prevention 
of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, the delay may be extended 
up to 48 hours where it is considered that the use of this right will 
(i) lead to interference with the gathering of information about the
commission, preparation or instigation of a terrorist act or, 
(2) lead to alerting persons who will prevent the investigation of ter­
rorist acts or worse still proceed to their execution. Nevertheless, in the case 
of children or young offenders, as the Commission proposed,045) a parent 
or guardian is to be informed of the arrest, the reason for it and the place 
where the juvenile is being detained. 
The Act makes it quite clear that these rights are additional to those 
afforded to other offenders by the law itself. 146 In addition, the Draft Code 
on Questioning entitles Commonwealth citizens or aliens to benefit from 
this right by communicating without delay with their High Commission, 
Embassy or Consulate. The Draft Code, however, distinguishes between 
foreigners in three ways. In the case of a national of a country which is 
bound by a Consular Convention binding as well on England, the 
appropriate consulate shall be informed as soon as practicable; where the 
detainee is any other foreigner he shall be informed of his rights without 
delay; and in the case of Commonwealth citizens they shall be told that if 
they wish the police will inform their High Commission of the detention 
together with brief details of the reasons thereof. They shall be told of such 
a right, however, after they have been detained for more than 24 hours. The 
procedure of communication is curiously far from uniform and leaves the 
present writer uncomfortable with the state of affairs, particularly as 
regards the third category of foreigners. 
The position, prior to the proposed statutory inclusion in the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, of the right to seek access to legal advice during 
police detention, was devoid of any legislative force. There was no statutory 
rule guaranteeing that right except under the Scottish Criminal Procedure 
Act 1975, although this was restricted to cases when the suspect was already 
charged. Apart from that Act, the position in England and Wales was 
restricted to point (c) in the preamble to the Judges' Rules and reinforced by 
Administrative Direction No. 7a(I) of the same rules. However, despite the 
crime organise, afin en toute probabilite de notifier l'arrestation du suspect a ses 
complices. Le gouvernement, devantage circonspect nie ce motif; il constte que cell-ci 
est, plutot, meme un juriste, puisse, par malchance, avertir un complice. Gouvernement 
nevrose, ou malhonnete? Nous ne savons pas, mais nous pensons qu'une societe libre 
n'accepte qu'a a contrecoeur et seulement en cas d'extreme necessite (tel que le 
terrorisme auquel une legislation particuliere s'applique), l'incommunicado. vide op. cit 
at fn. 92. 
145 Report para. 4.78. 
146 Section 57 sub-section 9. 
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fact that the right could be exercised also when the suspect in custody 
but not necessarily charged, it was only allowed if no hindrance or unreason­
able delay was likely to be caused to the processes of investigation or the 
administration of justice. Furthermore there is the implication that police 
officers only have a duty in bringing these rights to detainees' knowledge by 
simply having signs and notices of them set up in conspicuous and 
convenient places in police stations, 147 a state of affairs rightly, described 
by Professor Leigh as being monstrous. 148 
The other statutory sources to be found in English law regulating this 
right in section 62 of the Criminal law Act 1977, a provision that seems to 
consolidate the exercise of two rights into one. Section 62 of that Act only 
caters for the intimation of one person reasonably named by the detainee, 
to be informed of his arrest and custody in police detention. To this extent 
the Police and the Criminal Evidence Act clearly provides for t&e separate 
facility of having someone informed of the arrest and the right to ask for 
legal advice. Furthermore, the previous sources of rules regulating both 
rights had two main weaknesses as pointed out by the Home Office in its 
Memorandum 149 to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. 
The first point is that the rights they advocate are restricted only to 
persons arrested and in custody but not during questioning. Professor Leigh 
adds that ''the directions do not purport to impose any obligation on the 
part of the police to allow the suspect's solicitor to be present during inter­
rogation or even to allow the suspect access to a solicitor before interro­
gation. 150 A second flaw is that the right as it stands presently is hampered 
in its effective use by provisions based largely on the 'nebulous standard' of 
reasonableness. In addition there is one overall weakness, particularly 
insofar as the Judges' Rules are concerned as Professor Zander points out, 
that "the courts seem never to have given authoritative guidance as to what 
. constitutes circumstances that justify the police in refusing a suspect the 
right to speak to his lawyer."· 
In the People (D.P.P.) v Madden and Ors, the Irish Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that a person bas a right of reasonable access to his legal 
advisers when held by the Gardai. The judge added that ''in this context the 
word 'reasonable' must be construed as having regard to all tbe circum­
stances of each individual case and, in particular, as to the time at which 
access is requested and the availability of the legal adviser sought" . 151 
Professor Zander expressed concern that in the absence of judicial guidance 
in this respect, abuse is most likely to occur, if at least by the police taking 
upon themselves the broad interpretation of the rules in their favour. 1s2 
147 
148 
149 
1SO 
1S1 
i« 
H.O. Circular No. 89/1978. 
Leigh Memo. on Evidence at pp. 6S. 
Memo. No. IV on the Law and Procedure relating to the Questioning of Persons in the 
Investigation of Crime. 
"Police Powers in England and Wales" at pp. 1SS. 
(1977) I.R. 366 at 3SS.
A suspicion which was confirmed by Professor Zander through a number of research 
studies carried out with a view to discover (i) the extent to which suspects were allowed to 
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One proposal for reform put forward by the Australian Criminal 
Investigation Bill 1977 and supported by Professor Leigh, is in virtue of 
clause 20 of that Bill. It obliges the officer to provide reasonable facilities 
for the detainee to communicate with a lawyer if the latter so requests and 
to make possible the presence of that lawyer during any investigative 
action taken against the suspect. However attractive such a proposal may 
seem, it is unlikely to be welcomed by the police authorities in view of the 
great possibility of impeding investigation. 153 It is worthwile to point out 
that similar obstacles are encountered by New York Policemen in which 
State, exist very wide measures catering for the protection of detainees, by 
virtue of both the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as para. 
6 of the New York State Constitution which allows a counsel to assist the 
suspect at every stage of the legal proceedings. 154' In sharp contrast to such 
proposals are Lord Widgery's views put forward to the American Bar 
Association in 1971. He was quoted as saying that: "any rule requiring the 
presence of the suspect's lawyer during interrogation is quite unaccept­
able". 155 However, his Lordship did further add to the possibility of 
having an independent third party during questioning time so as to be able 
to testify later in court as to what had taken place. The implication clearly is 
that a lawyer is far from considered to be an independent third party during 
questioning. This view was considered though rejected as a proposal by the 
Royal Commission. 156 As far as the presence of a third party is concerned 
the Home Office Memorandum on Crime Investigation and the Questioning 
of Persons 157 deals extensively with the advantages and difficulties involved 
with the implementation of such a proposal. The Commission swiftly 
dismissed the proposal on the basis of organisational problems rather than 
on the substantive issue of attempting to improve a situation so much in need 
of a compromise to strike the balance of power in the suspect's direction. 15s 
The Home Office Memorandum sees three initial difficulties which 
such a proposition may involve. These are: (i) the possible view that sus­
pects in police detention may not want the presence of a friend or relative as 
a third party, (ii) third parties who have no connection whatsoever with the 
case, usually tend to be unwilling to act as witnesses during police inter­
rogation. The reason mainly being that such sessions seem to enjoy a certain 
notoriety particularly with regard to pohce behaviour towards members of 
local communities; (iii) finally, security problems may be caused which add 
to the interruption of questioning. One further problem is envisaged by the 
Home Office. Undoubtedly the presence of any person foreign to the whole 
consult a solicitor and (ii) to find out how far the police went to provide facilities for 
consultations with solicitors, and for actually informing suspects of their rights; vide 
"Access to a solicitor in a Police Station" C.L.R. 1972 at pp. 342. 
153 Vide Leigh Memo. on Evidence at pp. 67. 
154 Vide "The Expanding Right to Counsel in N. Y." by D .M. Zverins in 10 Fordham Urban
Law Jnl. 1982 351-353. 
155 Vide op.cit. by Zander in C.L.R. 1972 at 347. 
156 Report para. 4.99. 
157 Memo. No. V. 
158 Vide fn. 155 at para 4.100. 
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incident, will definitely have an effect not solely upon the interview but 
particularly on the interviewee especially if that person is related to the third 
party wltich would make him feel all the more uncomfortable and con­
sequently prolong the interview by making it that much more difficult for 
the police to get at the facts. As the Memorandum puts it "the presence of a 
familiar face in unfamiliar surroundings can have a supportive effect on the 
suspect, which is likely to make him less inclined to answer police 
questions" .m On the other hand, it is possible to envisage one- advantage 
at least from the presence of a third party, that is he may be the only 
safeguard in the circumstances against gross misconduct on behalf of the 
police. Regrettably, however, the Memorandum, as with the Commission, 
does not go as far as to conclude that such a person would in practice prove 
his purpose namely to be an independent party at the trial. 160 
As far as young off enders and mentally handicapped people are 
concerned, both the Home Office Memorandum and the Report of the Com­
mission take a more sympathetic, if not an understanding attitude, towards 
the presence of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the offend­
er in question. Administrative direction No. 4 of the Judges' Rules provides 
for the presence of that party during questioning of off enders under the age of 
parent/ guardian to be of the same sex as the detainee; and the second 
the same sex as the detainee, other than a police officer, will be allowed as a 
substitute and in addition it is recommended that if possible arrest should 
not take place at school. If such a measure cannot be prevented from taking 
place, the interview at school will be held only with the consent and in the 
presence of the head teacher or his nominee. However, there is one problem 
with these safeguards, namely, that they are to be executed only insofar as 
they are practicable. The Royal Commission in fact proposes only two 
changes to the existing provision. Apart from the Home Office's suggestion 
to reduce the age-limit from 17 to 16 which the Commission did not take up, 
it proposed the following changes: the first proposal is to do away with the 
unnecessary obligation of requiring the person substituting for the 
parent/guardian to be out of the same sex as the detainee; and the second. 
proposal which states that the proposed safeguards can only be executed 
where· practicable, needs clarification. As regards the first point, it is 
preferable that the person present during interrogation should be someone 
known to and who enjoys the confidence of the young interviewee, and he 
should always be present when the interview commences. Therefore, the 
proviso "as far as practicable" should be limited only to cases in which 
waiting for the arrival of an adult will involve a risk of harm being caused to 
persons or serious damage to property. 161 
As regards mentally handicapped persons undergoing questioning by 
policemen, the Commission could not come forward with such easily 
available solutions as are available with young offenders. Administrative 
159 Op.cit. No. V issued by the H.O. on Law and Procedure of the Questioning of Persons 
at p. 136. 
160 Vide fn. 157. 
161 For discussion of the consideration vide report paras. 4.102-4.104. 
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direction 4A(a) of the Judges' Rules burdens the officer with the unenviable 
responsibility of determining how to deal with persons suffering from mental 
handicap, particularly in how to treat their answers when considering the 
possible gullible nature of such persons and their susceptibility to sugges­
tion. For this reason the Commission suggests the presence of a medical 
doctor. In addition a social worker should also be called in, "in loco 
parentis", unless, of course, it would be more appropriate for the parents 
or guardian to be there instead. 162 
Nevertheless, these reform proposals, if ever transformed into safe­
guards for the interviewee, should be made available in addition to the over­
riding and more effective right to seek legal advice. If at all, Judges' Rules 
far from being abolished or restricted in providing access to a solicitor, should 
be re-defined and enforced so as to give some practical effect to the policy 
that a man should be entitled to legal advice when facing the police. 163 
Right of Legal Advice 
The Home Office reaffirms the principle that if a person in custody 
wishes to consult a solicitor, he shall be granted the opportunity, although 
administrative and financial issues may cause problems. The Commission 
set out to settle such interrelated problems and in attempting to follow suit 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provides the statutory framework for 
that settlement. 
On the conclusions reached by the Commission, 164 the Act stipulates 
that a solicitor may be consulted by a detainee privately 165 and "at any 
time". However this Act does not, at any point mention the fact as sug­
gested by the Commission that the suspect should be formally notified of 
his right and for that notification to be recorded. What the Act provides is 
for the request to be made by the suspect and for that request to be notified. 
Rather than making it illegal for any questions to be put to the suspect 
before legal advice· can be sought, the Act provides that the right should be 
carried out as soon as practicable, unless of course a total suspension of the 
right altogether is issued. 
A case recently decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in the State v 
Strickler, reaffirmed that the right to counsel under the U.S. Constitution 
aris�s upon the initiation of a formal indictment. Therefore, "when one is 
advised and thus presumed to be aware of his right to counsel and does not 
exercise that known right, but instead submits to a line-up prior to formal 
162 Vide keport paras. 4.105 to 4.108. 
163 M. Zander "Access to a Solicitor in a Police Station" 1972 C.L.R. 347. 
164 Report paras. 4.81 to 4.93. 
165 Byrne, Hogan and Macdermott in "Prisoners' rights - A Study in Irish Pric;on Law" 
1981 at pp. 14, refer to the case of The State (Harrington) v Gorda Commissioner, where 
it was held that "having regard ... to the extreme importance of this right and to the 
major inroad on the liberty of the individual which its denial or restriction would involve 
... a detained person is entitled to access to his legal adviser, this must be achieved in 
privacty and out of the hearing of any member of the Gardia Siochana". 
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charges being lodged against him, he cannot be said to have been deprived 
of his constitutional right to counsel". 166 
The position in American Law, by virtue of the outstanding cases of 
DiBiasi 167 and Donavan- 168 Arthur 169 which stipulated that the right to
counsel should be exercised at the arraignment stage rather than at the indict­
ment stage of the proceedings, is now interpreted as to signify that any line of 
police questioning attempting to extricate a statement or to induce the 
suspect to waiver his rights in the absence of a counsel, should not be 
allowed. The landmarks in U.S. jurisprudence therefore extend constitu­
tional protections of the suspect, reaffirm the Miranda warnings and by 
virtue of People v Hobson 110 expands the Miranda principles by not 
allowing a person to waive his rights without the presence of a lawyer. In 
fact, Mr. Kamisar in his essay ''The Right to be Informed of Legal Rights: 
The Miranda Warnings", observed that the U.S. Supreme Court "was in 
the process of re-shaping 'a novel right not to confess except knowingly and 
with the tactical assistance of counsel' ''. 172 
Section 5.07 of the Model Code on Pre-Arraignment Procedure, 
drafted by the American Law Institute, provides an acceptable compromise 
as to the debate at which point or for how long during police questioning 
should a lawyer be allowed to make his entrance. The proposed article calls 
for "prompt access" to a legal adviser by the detainee, and counsel is not to 
be prevented from staying at any place where the detainee is kept. The latter 
shall also be given reasonable opportunity from time to time to consult in 
private with his counsel. The Institute's main intention by the introduction 
of such a provision was not solely related to ensuring that the suspect is not 
held incommunicado, but concern was also forthcoming in order to prevent 
any exercise of abuse or coercion being made upon the detainee. However, 
this condition of having a counsel present is not absolute nor is it applicable 
during the first four hours of initial questioning as proposed in .article 4 of 
the same Draft Code. 173 
It is only fair to point out that the Draft Codes of Practice for 
Detention, Treatment, Questioning, and Identification of Persons by the 
Police and for the Searching of Premises and Seizure of Property, issued by 
the Home Office provide a set of rules very similar to the rule applied in 
American Law. Paragraph 5.3 of the Draft Codes of Practice clearly shows 
a detained person not to be inteviewed by an officer until he receives legal 
advice where he so requested it and this was granted to him. It would, of 
course, be naively presumptuous to assume that such a rule is unqualified, 
particularly in relation to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which 
166 63 Ohio st. 2d 47 406 N.E. 2d 1110. 
167 7 N.Y. 2d 544, 166 N.E. 2d 825, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (1960). 
168 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (1963). 
169 22 N.Y. 2d 325, 239 N.E. 2d 537, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 663 (1968). 
170 39 N.Y. 2d 479, 348 N.E. 2d 849, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (1976). 
171 Vide also 10 Fordham Urban L.Jnl. (1982) at 359 et seq. 
172 Vide "The Supreme Court and Human Rights", Edited by Burke Marshall. Forum 
Series, 1982. 
173 Vide op.cit. at pp. 184-187. 
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epitomises the use and function of provisos. Therefore, where an officer (at 
least holding the rank of a superintendent) has reasonable grounds to believe, 
(i) that delay in questioning would mean running a risk to harm persons
or cause serious loss or damage to property; or 
(ii) waiting for a solicitor will disturb the process of investigation; or
finally, 
(iii) if the detainee consents in writing to commence the interview, the
right to see his solicitor shall not apply. However, although the solicitor 
may attend the interview, if the superintendent or a higher ranking officer 
considers his behaviour to be of an obstacle to the questioning he shall be 
asked to leave. 
A relaxation of the right to have a solicitor present during questioning 
is also found in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, although with graver 
consequences, on two separate grounds which allow for the suspension of 
the right under discussion. These two grounds found in Section 58(6), which 
allow a delay in fulfilling the detainee's right to seek legal advice, are (i) 
where the suspect is in detention for a serious arrestable offence, and (ii) 
where a superintendent authorises it. In the words of the Commission, these 
grounds are dictated by limited and exceptional circumstances where the 
interests of the suspect have to be subordinated to those of other individuals 
who may be at risk, and in favour of the wider interests of society. 174 It 
would not seem difficult to appreciate that such a statement justifies the 
criticism directed against the Commission's Report, accusing it of tipping 
the balance in favour of the police. The reasons for the two grounds 
warranting a delay to grant the right, were tailored presumably to clothe the 
same apprehensions involved with the similar right under the Act to have 
someone informed of one's arrest. Nevertheless, it is strongly suggested, 
that where basic human rights are concerned, no matter how heinous or 
grave certain offences are, as Lord Hooson reminded us, it is not a question 
of balance or equilibrium but a matter of fundamental principles of dignity 
and humane treatment. The grounds for authorising a delay in the exercise 
of the right to seek legal advice are once again identical to those reasons 
which under the Act deny the suspect his right to have someone informed of 
the arrest. Also identical is the time limit of 36 hours from the relevant time 
a(ter which the right to seek counsel must be carried out. 
However, the Act's provisions regulating persons in detention 
suspected of having committed terrorist acts leave much to be desired. The 
time limit of 36 hours within which the right to legal access should be 
exercised is extended up to 48 hours. Furthermore, where a suspect is 
detained under terrorism provisions which may give rise to the grounds 
upon which his rights may be delayed, he will only be allowed to speak to 
his solicitor in the sight and hearing of an officer who has nothing to do 
with the case and at least holds the rank of an inspector. 
In essence, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act has three veins, all 
running like a silver thread through most, if not all, of its main clauses. The 
174 Report para, 4.90. 
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first, touches upon the unreliable standard of reasonableness usually left at 
the discretion of police officers to decide whatever the provisions may 
mean. A second point relates, mainly to decisions being taken by officers in 
higher ranks. Third, the decisions and acts taken by police officers must be 
recorded in a custody record. All three purport to guise, if not to minimise, 
the real effect of the large, discretionary powers entrusted to the police by 
the new law. These three points were observed by Lord Scarman in the 
debate of the second reading of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill in the 
House of Lords. 175 His Lordship pointed them out with the hope to meet 
what he aptly described "a historical challenge for the House to exercise its 
revising skills on the Bill." If, however, there is any reason as to why the 
skills of revision were not put to test, they do not certainly lie with the 
various extra-parliamentary voices of admonition and perhaps neither with 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, although the mills of 
commission authorities usually grind slowly. However, the challenge will 
only be affronted gradually, as the "Blindfolded Lady" is very old and the 
proces of face lifting is therefore of necessity slow and gentle. Other 
rheumatic pains and wrinkles of age remain. Only successive legislatures 
may help the Act in easing an ache here and smoothing a wrinkle there. 176 
175 Vide Debates in House of Lords Weekly Handsar, 4th June, 1984 col. 433 - 434.
176 M. Belli "The Belli Files", Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1983. 
